Audio reveals control room ordered train to move despite stopped traffic

Recordings released on Tuesday show that a control center operator in Madrid authorized a high-speed train to resume movement at normal speed while another train remained stopped on the tracks ahead. The incident led to a collision in the Toledo province that killed at least 68 people and hospitalized 110 others. The audio, which captures the final communications before the crash, places direct scrutiny on the decision-making process within the infrastructure administrator Adif.

The sequence began when the driver of Renfe train 2080 reported a technical failure in the transmission system. He noted that the central unit at Urda had failed, indicating a breakdown in the signaling infrastructure. The operator at the Atocha control center instructed the driver to disconnect the system and then reconnect the LZB4 signal. At 8:36 a.m., the operator explicitly told the driver to resume the journey with normal speed under the lateral signaling block system, without mentioning that another train was stationary further down the line.

Minutes later, the driver of Iryo train 6076 called in to report that her train was stopped at the entry signal for Urda due to a loss of transmission. The control center initially told her to stay alert but then instructed her to disconnect and reconnect her signal system as well. She was also told to resume movement under normal speed conditions. The driver indicated that she would start moving only after a timer reset, suggesting the departure would not be immediate. However, the two trains were moving toward each other in the same corridor with limited visibility of the stopped traffic.

Spanish Transport Minister Óscar Puente stated that a rear-end collision on the Spanish network is truly improbable. He acknowledged that the main safety system failed around 8:30 a.m., causing six trains to stop in the area. Puente said the operator made a decision six minutes after the initial stoppage to allow the trains to continue with normal speed. He described the decision as inexplicable because the affected circuit was occupied by the stopped Iryo train, and a red signal was present, which should have prevented the Renfe train from moving at full speed.

According to the minister, there was a 17-minute window between the clearance at 8:36 a.m. and the impact at approximately 8:53 a.m. During that time, the Renfe train covered 25 kilometers, or about 15 miles, and may have reached speeds of up to 200 kilometers per hour, or 124 miles per hour. Puente noted that one train reported that protocol required moving at a reduced speed of no more than 40 kilometers per hour, but this specific instruction was not communicated to the Renfe train that ultimately crashed. The minister emphasized that the decision to resume circulation without the system being fully restored rested with the control center operators.

The investigation is now focused on determining why the operator ordered the train to move when another was stopped just 15 miles ahead. The Guardia Civil has questioned the person responsible for the command center in Madrid who issued the orders. A judge in the case has barred unauthorized personnel from entering an area within two kilometers of the high-speed line between Madrid and Seville. The court order also prohibits the removal of any elements from the scene or the dissemination of images, aiming to preserve evidence for the ongoing inquiry into the human error and technical failures that led to the disaster.